Polish Border Crossing - Korczowa-Krakowiec

In order to establish a baseline for refugee activity after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we determined that a comparison needed to be made between claimed border crossings facilitating large movements of people. For Western Ukraine, Poland provides a case study. On March 18th, 2022, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 42,273 refugees entered Poland through the six border crossings with Ukraine. Imagery analysis of the Korczowa-Krakowiec border crossing, one of the border crossings closest to UNHCR humanitarian centers, on that date shows a sizable queue of civilian and commercial vehicles. Using 13 images analyzed post-invasion, an average of 95 cars and 110 trucks can be observed crossing from Ukraine to Poland. This is in contrast to an average of 31 cars and 60 trucks pre-invasion from August 2018 to January 2021.

The activity at this checkpoint observed in imagery analysis corroborates the UNHCR's report. Furthermore, the evident increase in traffic in response to the refugee crisis acts as a baseline for traffic levels expected at Russia-Ukraine border checkpoints based on Russian state-backed media claims of incoming refugee numbers.

Russian Border Crossings

The Russian government and leadership of the breakaway regions claimed to have maintained 15 border crossings between the Rostov Region of the Russian Federation and the self-proclaimed “People's Republics” since the invasion of Ukraine. These include seven pedestrian, two railway, and six automobile crossings at Novoshakhtinsk, Chertkovo, and Donetsk (city in Rostov Oblast) near the self-proclaimed Luhansk People's Republic, as well as Kuibyshevo, Veselo-Voznesenka, and Matveev Kurgan near the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic. Some reports have also included the Gukovo border crossing as an automobile and a rail crossing. Most Russian border crossings we analyzed showed relatively low civilian vehicle counts and a general lack of a crowded or busy appearance since the outbreak of the war. However, Russian state media has continuously emphasized the reportedly large flows of refugees from Ukraine, primarily towards the Rostov region in the southwest of the Russian Federation, which was the primary focus of our analysis of Ukraine-Russian border crossings.

Claim #1 - On March 26th, Border Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (PS FSB) reported that 16,000 civilians crossed from Donbas into the Rostov Region.

Russian Border Crossing - Kuibyshevo

Imagery analysis of the Kuibyshevo border from March 2020 to November 2021, exemplified by the November 18th, 2021 image, suggests a decrease in overall traffic volume following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as shown in the March 26th image. Before the invasion, there is consistent evidence of significant civilian and commercial traffic, primarily flowing from Ukraine into Russia. Before the invasion, images taken between March 2020 and November 2021, show an average of approximately 32 cars and 23 trucks over 20 images.

On March 26th, 2022, traffic levels dropped to approximately eight cars and zero trucks. As seen at the Polish crossing, if thousands of people were trying to cross the border on March 26th, we should expect to see queues of vehicles forming at Kuibyshevo. There is evidence of queuing at the border in April 2022; however, traffic levels remained far below pre-invasion traffic volumes, with 17 cars and approximately one truck seen on April 30th, 2022.

Russia Border Crossing - Matveev Kurgan

Imagery analysis of the Matveev Kurgan border from July 2020 to April 2021, exemplified by the September 2nd, 2020 image, further suggests a sharp decrease in traffic entering Russia from Ukraine relative to post-invasion levels, as exemplified in the March 26th image. Imagery post-invasion shows minimal traffic queuing at the border to enter Russia. We see an average of approximately 20 commercial trucks and 50 automobiles in the pre-invasion period analyzed, whereas those numbers drop to around eight trucks and less than ten cars on March 26th, 2022, which could carry roughly 100 people in a single day.¹ The PS FSB reported over 16,000 civilians crossing into the Rostov region in a 24-hour period. Considering there are only seven open border crossings, it is unlikely the large Russian number could be reached while seeing such low traffic reflected at Matveev Kurgan. Some commercial traffic before the border crossing on the Russian side of the border is visible in the post-invasion imagery; however, we do not know if these vehicles have been parked for an extended period.

Claim #2 - Mikhail Mizintsev, chief of Russia's National Defense Management Center, claims 14,168 people and 3,300 private cars evacuated from Ukraine on April 1st, and 16,648 people and 2,805 private cars entered Russia from Ukraine on April 3rd.

Russian Border Crossing - Donetsk (Izvarino)

Imagery analysis from August 2019 to June 2021, exemplified by the July 3rd, 2020 image, showed an average of approximately 50 cars queued and two commercial trucks. On April 3rd, 2022, over a month after the initial invasion of Ukraine, we saw roughly half the previous traffic count at the Donetsk (Izvarino) border crossing with 24 automobiles and one truck visible on that day. At the same time, Russia's National Defense Management Center claimed that 2,805 automobiles had entered Russia.

Russian Border Crossing - Veselo-Voznesenka

The only border crossing with evidence of notable traffic levels post-invasion is at the Veselo-Voznesenka border crossing near the town of Maksimov, directly east of Mariupol, Ukraine. There were heavy fluctuations in traffic levels throughout the analyzed period of May 2020 to August 2021, ranging from one civilian automobile to 82 a week later. This inconsistency made determining baseline levels for this crossing more challenging. However, on April 6th, 2022, imagery shows traffic levels within historical bounds, with 23 trucks and 84 automobiles seen. These numbers suggest a modest influx of refugees from Mariupol but still do not account for the 15,000-20,000 refugees Russian authorities have claimed are entering the country on a daily basis, which is not evident throughout the imagery.

Additional Context:

Our analysis suggests that lower post-invasion activity trends continue to hold across the Chertkovo, Gukovo, and Novoshakhtinsk border crossings. Before analyzing each border crossing individually, it is important to note that these three border crossings are the farthest from the main population centers of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, such as the Ukrainian cities of Donetsk, Luhansk, Horlivka, Alchevsk, Khrustalnyi, and Makiivka. These include cities with populations over 50,000 people. Chertkovo was the only crossing located outside of the territory of the self-proclaimed People's Republics before the invasion. Based on this analysis, we expect with moderate confidence that fewer civilians would be traveling to these specific border crossings from Ukraine.

Chertkovo Border Crossing

Over a period from July 2020 to December 2020, there was at most one car and one truck observed in our imagery analysis. After the invasion, on March 13th, 15 cars and no trucks were observed. On April 11th, imagery displayed seven cars and no trucks crossing into Russia. Additionally, the border crossing at Chertkovo is located on a small, poorly maintained, two-lane road, which could be a bottleneck if large numbers of refugees were attempting to cross into Russia. This border crossing is also far removed from large urban population centers relative to the distance of other crossing points in the region. The nearest large city to this crossing is the city of Luhansk over 100 kilometers away compared to the crossing at Donetsk (Izvarino) at approximately 50 kilometers away (see map above).

Novoshakhtinsk Border Crossing

Over the period from February 2020 to October 2021, there was an average of 22 cars and 23 trucks. Only one cloudy image was available post-invasion, preventing any averages from being determined. However, queues of pre-invasion length were not observed in visible areas. Though this crossing has more developed infrastructure than the Chertkovo crossing, there are still bottlenecks, namely traffic being limited to one lane around crossing stations. This factor, along with Novoshakhtinsk's distance from major population centers, like Khrustalnyi or Dovzhansk, means it is unlikely that the volume of traffic is large enough to alter our thesis and align with substantial Russian claims. Larger traffic volumes would likely occur at closer crossings such as Kuibyshevo.

Gukovo Crossing

Imagery analysis over a period from March 2021 to September 2021 showed an average of 28 cars and 33 trucks. No imagery was available for analysis post-invasion. However, the Gukovo crossing is located between the Novoshakhtinsk and Donetsk (Izvarino) border crossings, with the nearest significant population center located at Dovzhansk with a population of approximately 62,000 people. For all other urban centers with over 50,000 people in Eastern Ukraine, like Khrustalnyi, Luhansk, and Alchevske, the Novoshakhtinsk or Donetsk border crossings would be closer to travel to via major highways, as can be seen in the map above. For this reason, we would expect minimal traffic at the Gukovo crossing, in line with what we have observed at the other crossings.

In total

With these seven border crossings considered, the number of refugees entering Russia from Ukraine after February 24th, 2022 is likely far short of the 1.2 million refugees claimed by the Russian government. This is evidenced by the minimal traffic at automobile border crossings between the Donbas region of Ukraine and the Rostov Oblast in the Russian Federation. It is important to note that there are multiple alternative methods for evacuating refugees and evacuees: pedestrian (for immediate vicinity to operational border checkpoints) and air and rail transportation. However, it is well-established that air transportation over Ukraine has been closed to all commercial air traffic since the Russian invasion. As for the possibility of evacuations by rail transportation, we next analyzed imagery of the Port of Mariupol. Lastly, pedestrian foot traffic analysis with imagery can prove difficult unless people are bunched in large crowds or long lines. No crowds or lines were observed.

Ukraine Port - Mariupol

Large numbers of refugees were claimed to evacuate Mariupol due to the intense concentration of fighting en route towards Russia, according to TASS (a Russian state-owned news agency). To augment our previous analysis of automobile activity at the nearby Veselo-Voznesenka crossing, we decided to look at alternative methods of leaving Mariupol. As noted, there were two possible railway crossings from Ukraine to the Rostov region in Russia. We chose to briefly analyze railway activity at the Port of Mariupol prior and post-invasion due to its prominence in the conflict. Based on activity at the rail station at the Port of Mariupol, we see no movement in rail traffic for the duration of the war. Most rail lines have been blocked for a significant duration since the start of the war.

Concluding Analysis of Russian State and State-Affiliated Media Claims and Imagery Evidence

The Russian invasion of Ukraine created one of the worst humanitarian disasters in modern-day Europe, with over 6.3 million people displaced since February 24th, 2022. Additionally, the UNHCR has reported, based on data from the Russian government, that 105,000 people crossed into Russia from Donbas between February 18th and February 24th, 2022. Since the beginning of the war, most Russia-Ukraine border checkpoints have not seen a substantial increase in refugee inflows (represented by crowded or busy-looking vehicle activity on imagery) compared to border checkpoints in Western Ukraine.

Based on official reporting by the Russian state or state-affiliated media and imagery analysis of border crossing points between Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and Poland, it becomes fairly apparent that traffic activity between Ukraine and Russia has been modest. Despite the official claims of the Russian government, it is likely the number of people leaving Ukraine for Russia post-February 24th might be significantly smaller than the 1.2 million refugees claimed by Russia state-backed media outlets. We assess with moderate confidence that the refugee numbers may be overstated based on the observed low activity at the border.

According to TASS, a Russian state-owned news agency, Russia has accepted over 1.1 million Ukrainian refugees as of May 4th. However, based on imagery analysis, official Russian statistics on Ukrainian refugees may be inflated, and authorities may be deliberately conflating the numbers prior and post-invasion in accounting for the total numbers of refugees and evacuees since April 2014 and not only since February 2022. The Russian authorities may be using this “small print" public maneuver for dramatic effect to present a more positive image of the war to Russian-speaking audiences. The Kremlin also may be utilizing this strategy to bolster the support for the invasion and fortify the framing of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine as innocent victims whose suffering and pleas at the hands of a neo-Nazi regime since 2014 justify the Russian intervention currently. Simultaneously, such claims aim to evoke sympathy, solidarity, and fortification of the support base and infrastructure in border regions, such as Rostov oblast, and ultimately “rally around the flag” effects supporting Putin's decision to attack Ukraine.

Our analysis concentrated on TASS's English reports because excelTASS Claims over Timetheir articles covered refugee and evacuee movements in a fairly consistent periodic manner and included numbers that could be fact-checked against imagery. Other Russian state-affiliated news outlets, such as Channel One Russia and RIA Novosti, made broad claims and reporting relied on aggregate numbers, which were harder to use in our analysis. TASS is also the largest and most well-known news agency in Russia, registered as a Federal State Unitary Enterprise. The Government of Russia owns business entities registered with this title, thus making TASS a state-owned news agency. Along with Russia Today and RIA Novosti, the U.S. State Department identified TASS as a critical player in the Russian government's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem. Throughout the invasion of Ukraine, publications by TASS have aligned with Kremlin-backed narratives to promote the conflict to Russian citizens. These narratives generally portray Ukraine and Western governments as instigators of the conflict, the Russian Armed Forces as a liberating force, and Ukrainian civilians as welcoming Russia's intervention.

Notes

1. We assumed an average of five people per vehicle crossing the border. We over-estimated the number of people that can reasonably fit into a truck cab but believe even with this over-estimate, it highlights the likely over-estimated nature of Russian claims. Moreover, this is based on a snapshot in imagery and the count could likely increase with more collection, but we wanted to supply the reader with a simple, estimated vehicle-to-people conversion.