Chinese investments in Russian Arctic energy projects are facing complications due to sanctions on Russia.

GEOINT analysis confirms Russian public declarations to expand the storage facilities at Okolnaya submarine support base and Gadzhiyevo submarine base.

Upgrades at Severomorsk-1 Air base increases Russia's operational readiness, presence, and capabilities in the northwest Arctic region, improving domain awareness and operational capacity around the Kola Peninsula. Further upgrades would expand operational capacity towards the GIUK-N Gap. However, GEOINT analysis shows slow construction progress.

Russia's military posture and the deployment of S-400s in its Western Arctic reflects the Soviet legacy of bastion defense comprised of "concentric circles" designed to protect strategic territory.

Ecuador's desire to become a global exporter of copper coincides with increased Chinese demand for and investment in copper mining. Both copper mines in Ecuador are owned by the same Chinese company. The inauguration of mine construction and activity has led to negative environmental damage and forced relocations of indigenous communities at both mines.

Expansion of copper mining is driving economic growth in Peru, which coincides with increased Chinese demand and investment in copper mining. Chinese involvement in Peru's mining sector varies by project and is often obfuscated through intermediary company involvement in mine acquisition or construction.

Though Chinese "Belt-and-Road Initiative" (BRI) investments and related economic activities abroad have been a touchpoint for international studies, this report poses a hypothetical "what if" scenario and seeks to address one facet of the potential implications if Chinese facilities abroad are used for dual-use military/civilian purposes.

In contrast to our findings of BRI hydroelectric power projects in Bolivia, in Ecuador, we observe fewer problematic environmental impacts in the majority of Chinese projects, with several accompanied by substantial local community development initiatives.

The policy goals of the Made in China 2025 (MIC25) plan have increased development in Shenzhen High-Tech Industrial Park's dominant industries. From 2015 to 2022, imagery analysis showed increased activity and construction, much of which promoted MIC25's core industries.

Zhangjiang High-Tech Industrial Park predates the 2015 inauguration of Made in China 2025 (MIC25). However, development in the park reaffirms MIC25 goals. Activity in the park reflects the policy priorities of MIC25: talent recruitment, foreign investment, and green development.

The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) has garnered significant attention with respect to the construction of over three hundred missile silos dispersed across three silo fields. This report seeks to investigate the geospatial characteristics of each site and use that data to inform a search strategy. China watchers and analysts should have a systematic method for defining search strategies, and this report serves as a foundational first step in that effort.

In September 2020, against the backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic and with the global economy still reeling, China pledged that it would achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. In this two-part series, researchers from the Columbia School of International and Public Affairs explore China's progress towards that goal along two vectors: "brown" and "green." Part 2 ("green") examines how tree cover has changed in two provinces as China conducts major tree-planting efforts.

This report uses nighttime lighting data to track the relocation of Rohingya refugees from the Cox's Bazaar region of Bangladesh to Bhasan Char, a 'floating island' in the Bay of Bengal built by the Government of Bangladesh to house roughly 100,000 refugees. Constructed on reclaimed land in a monsoon, cyclone, and tsunami-prone region, Bhasan Char poses not only humanitarian challenges, but physical and human rights challenges as the Rohingya become isolated from the mainland.

A growing body of research has systematically documented Chinese efforts to imprison, detain, and re-educate ethnic Uyghur and minority groups throughout its western Xinjiang province. In this three-part investigation, RAND researchers explore new data on nighttime lighting in Xinjiang to offer new, empirical insights into China’s efforts to reeducate, detain, and imprison its Uyghur and ethnic minority populations across Xinjiang.

This report, the second in a three-part series, employs a novel empirical approach to systematically assess the current operating status of known detention facilities in Xinjiang using nighttime lighting. This analysis provides new, empirical evidence to suggest that the overwhelming majority of detention facilities in Xinjiang remain active, operational, and in many cases, still under construction – despite Chinese claims to the contrary.

This report, the final in our series, explores trends in the growth and decline of nighttime lighting over detention facilities across Xinjiang. It reveals evidence to suggest that long-term prisons have become a greater priority than reeducation centers, along with those located in rural areas or in areas administered by the XPCC, among other trends. Overall, this report helps chart the current trajectory of China’s widespread detention of Uyghur and ethnic minority populations in the region.

This study investigates the effectiveness of state-of-the-art deep learning models trained on high-resolution single-band satellite images in estimating site-level industrial development over time in the People's Republic of China.

North Korea's tourism industry took a major hit in 2020 when the pandemic forced the country to close its borders. Once high-profile construction projects, such as the Wonsan-Kalma Beach Resort, were effectively halted as priorities shifted toward domestically oriented projects. Despite a slow reopening to trade in 2022, activity at the North's key tourist sites remains largely unchanged.

In 2020, Typhoon Maysak ravaged North Korea's northeast provinces, devastating large portions of the mineral-rich mining region of Komdok. In the storm's wake, Kim Jong Un directed a plan to rebuild Komdok and transform it into a “model” mining community. Nearly two years later, the flood-damaged road and railway networks have been restored, and over 2,000 new housing units have been constructed.

Adequate domestic food production is a persistent challenge in North Korea, given its limited arable land. Long-term efforts to increase that capacity through tideland reclamation projects along the country’s west coast began in the 1980s, although suffered serious setbacks in the first decade due to poor engineering and maintenance and natural disasters.

North Korea’s cement industry is central to achieving several of the goals set forth in the new five-year economic plan. Cement and concrete are necessary for improvement or expansion of tourist facilities, housing, roads, major construction projects, and even non-carbon electrical energy production. However, it is difficult to assess the industry’s capacity, output, modernization and expansion.

China’s economic diplomacy has encouraged the use of special economic zones (SEZs) abroad. These areas of specialized regulation and incentives are aimed at attracting foreign investment. However, China’s emphasis on SEZs to promote quick economic growth has raised questions about whether China is sacrificing sustainable development for speed.

Evaluating the impact of SEZ development on land, water and air using satellite imagery, we identify examples of where zones appear to be succeeding or struggling to preserve and protect their local environmental conditions.

Social sustainability revolves around how the zone treats its workers and the surrounding community. We observed variation in the provision of housing, training facilities and quality of infrastructure supporting workers' commutes.

According to commercial satellite imagery and open-source reporting, Moscow dismantled tents at alleged filtration sites in the southern Donetsk Oblast region, at the Russian Veselo-Voznesenka border checkpoint, and along the M-2 Highway between the towns of Kharkiv and Belgorod in Russia likely due to the decline in displaced civilian movement (as evidenced in declining vehicle activity) and “filtration” needs through these areas.

This report summarizes confirmed impacts to cultural heritage sites due to the conflict in Ukraine between July and August 2022 by the Cultural Heritage Monitoring Lab (CHML). The methodology for the confirmation process relies on analysis of high-resolution commercial satellite imagery which has been supplied by CHML's partnership with NGA. In total, CHML analysts confirmed conflict-related impacts to 99 cultural sites between 1 July 2022 and 31 August 2022, totaling 207 since 24 February 2022.

This report summarizes confirmed impacts to cultural heritage sites due to the armed conflict in Ukraine between February and June 2022. All impact confirmations were made by the Cultural Heritage Monitoring Lab (CHML). CHML's methodology for the confirmation process relies on analysis of high-resolution commercial satellite imagery (access supplied by NGA). In total, CHML analysts confirmed conflict-related impacts to 108 cultural sites throughout Ukraine between 24 February and 30 June 2022.

Commercial satellite imagery analysis of the Russia-Ukraine border suggests that the Russian government may have inflated its claimed number of Ukrainian refugees entering Russia. The Kremlin likely boosted official statistics on accepted Ukrainian refugees to present a positive image of the war to Russian citizens and Russian speakers to justify operations in Ukraine.