GEOINT analysis confirms Russian public declarations to expand the storage facilities at Okolnaya submarine support base and Gadzhiyevo submarine base.

Upgrades at Severomorsk-1 Air base increases Russia's operational readiness, presence, and capabilities in the northwest Arctic region, improving domain awareness and operational capacity around the Kola Peninsula. Further upgrades would expand operational capacity towards the GIUK-N Gap. However, GEOINT analysis shows slow construction progress.

Russia's military posture and the deployment of S-400s in its Western Arctic reflects the Soviet legacy of bastion defense comprised of "concentric circles" designed to protect strategic territory.

Alexandra Land provides air-sea-land capabilities that reinforce Russia’s multi-layered maritime and air denial power; safeguard the Kola Peninsula which is home to Northern Fleet headquarters and Russia's control over the Northern Sea Route (NSR).

Current imagery does not show evidence of the Russian government's plans to expand Tiksi Airbase into a Northern Fleet air defense base, complete with 11 interconnected structures, and a regiment of S-400 surface-to-air missiles.

A complex layered coastal defense arrangement on Kotelny Island allows Russia to better defend and to deny aerial, maritime, or land access to NATO or U.S. forces.

In 2007 Russia re-prioritized the Arctic in keeping with Vladimir Putin's vision of restoring Russia's status as a great power. Now more than a decade later, Russia's military returns to the Arctic with strategic implications for the United States.

Ecuador's desire to become a global exporter of copper coincides with increased Chinese demand for and investment in copper mining. Both copper mines in Ecuador are owned by the same Chinese company. The inauguration of mine construction and activity has led to negative environmental damage and forced relocations of indigenous communities at both mines.

Expansion of copper mining is driving economic growth in Peru, which coincides with increased Chinese demand and investment in copper mining. Chinese involvement in Peru's mining sector varies by project and is often obfuscated through intermediary company involvement in mine acquisition or construction.

Though Chinese "Belt-and-Road Initiative" (BRI) investments and related economic activities abroad have been a touchpoint for international studies, this report poses a hypothetical "what if" scenario and seeks to address one facet of the potential implications if Chinese facilities abroad are used for dual-use military/civilian purposes.

In contrast to our findings of BRI hydroelectric power projects in Bolivia, in Ecuador, we observe fewer problematic environmental impacts in the majority of Chinese projects, with several accompanied by substantial local community development initiatives.

In line with the push for environmentally friendly Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure projects and Bolivia's former President Evo Morales' "2025 Patriotic Agenda" to transform Bolivia into a regional energy hub, China has supported six hydropower energy projects in the country. The success of these projects vary, and are more dependent on domestic factors in Bolivia than the actions of China.

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is not a monolithic enterprise. Across seven BRI port projects in Central America and the Caribbean, we find evidence that the project partnerships between China and recipient countries vary significantly regarding construction processes and end results.

In contrast to high carbon-emitting Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) energy projects in other countries, China has supported renewable and sustainable projects in Cuba. What sets the "Green BRI" in Cuba apart from the rest of the region?

A new rail extension to Apapa port aims to connect Nigeria’s hinterland to global markets to diversify its economy. However, the rail extension may fail to address severe congestion in Lagos’ port areas and high shipping costs will remain.

Despite anticipated positive impacts to the Nigerian economy, the Lagos-Ibadan railway has failed to generate positive economic spillover. Nigeria will need additional infrastructure investment to meet the promise of positive economic development.

The broad policy goals of the Made in China 2025 (MIC25) plan have a real-world activity impact on the urban layout of the Beijing Economic-Technological Development Area, most notably in residential and environmental activity. Further, industrial clusters and companies in the zone appear to be guided by the MIC25's ten core industries.

In September 2020, against the backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic and with the global economy still reeling, China pledged that it would achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. In this two-part series, researchers from the Columbia School of International and Public Affairs explore China's progress towards that goal along two vectors: "brown" and "green." Part 2 ("green") examines how tree cover has changed in two provinces as China conducts major tree-planting efforts.

In September 2020, against the backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic and with the global economy still reeling, China pledged that it would achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. In this two-part series, researchers from the Columbia School of International and Public Affairs explore China's progress towards that goal along two vectors: "brown" and "green". Part I ("brown") identifies 5 coal-fired power plants, approved in March 2020, and tracks their construction and continued development.

This is an article published by an NGA geodesy specialist on global navigation compatibility. This content is different than other Tearline content because the primary author is a government employee. Tearline is experimenting with this content type to broaden dissemination.

This report uses nighttime lighting data to track the relocation of Rohingya refugees from the Cox's Bazaar region of Bangladesh to Bhasan Char, a 'floating island' in the Bay of Bengal built by the Government of Bangladesh to house roughly 100,000 refugees. Constructed on reclaimed land in a monsoon, cyclone, and tsunami-prone region, Bhasan Char poses not only humanitarian challenges, but physical and human rights challenges as the Rohingya become isolated from the mainland.

A growing body of research has systematically documented Chinese efforts to imprison, detain, and re-educate ethnic Uyghur and minority groups throughout its western Xinjiang province. In this three-part investigation, RAND researchers explore new data on nighttime lighting in Xinjiang to offer new, empirical insights into China’s efforts to reeducate, detain, and imprison its Uyghur and ethnic minority populations across Xinjiang.

This report, the second in a three-part series, employs a novel empirical approach to systematically assess the current operating status of known detention facilities in Xinjiang using nighttime lighting. This analysis provides new, empirical evidence to suggest that the overwhelming majority of detention facilities in Xinjiang remain active, operational, and in many cases, still under construction – despite Chinese claims to the contrary.

This report, the final in our series, explores trends in the growth and decline of nighttime lighting over detention facilities across Xinjiang. It reveals evidence to suggest that long-term prisons have become a greater priority than reeducation centers, along with those located in rural areas or in areas administered by the XPCC, among other trends. Overall, this report helps chart the current trajectory of China’s widespread detention of Uyghur and ethnic minority populations in the region.

Analysis of 48 Uyghur cemeteries in Xinjiang indicates that while many were repurposed for the reasons cited by the Chinese government, fully a third were demolished with no further development on the site.

In this third Tearline report, RAND identified 21 facilities that could be where western researchers, press accounts and professional journals indicate preschool-aged Uyghur children are schooled and often housed in Qira (Chira) County, Hotan prefecture. Some of the newly identified facilities are on the grounds of primary schools, while others were not imaged frequently enough in the last four years to determine firm construction timelines.

RAND has identified 55 facilities suspected of housing young children the construction of which coincided with a publicly stated policy to build “boarding schools” in Xinjiang. Western researchers and press allege that Xinjiang authorities are using repurposed and newly built schools to board Uyghur youth as part of a policy of intergenerational separation.

Twenty facilities that imagery analysis, press and professional journals suggest house Uyghur children have been identified in this first study of geolocating China's detention infrastructure targeting Uyghurs and other Muslim minority groups.

This study defines and parses the differences between territorial / separatist terrorism versus non-territorial seeking terrorism from a spatial and geographic perspective. This spatial/geographic component of the research is foundational due to prior research often focusing on the motivations of terrorism rather than spatial and geographic perspectives.

Adequate domestic food production is a persistent challenge in North Korea, given its limited arable land. Long-term efforts to increase that capacity through tideland reclamation projects along the country’s west coast began in the 1980s, although suffered serious setbacks in the first decade due to poor engineering and maintenance and natural disasters.

North Korea’s cement industry is central to achieving several of the goals set forth in the new five-year economic plan. Cement and concrete are necessary for improvement or expansion of tourist facilities, housing, roads, major construction projects, and even non-carbon electrical energy production. However, it is difficult to assess the industry’s capacity, output, modernization and expansion.

The redevelopment of the Sepho Tableland is one example of North Korea’s efforts to adapt its agricultural practices to perform better within the constraints of the land. This project sought to convert high elevation terrains, which are not conducive to crop production, into grassy fields for supporting livestock farming, thus increasing protein production while maximizing less than ideal land resources.

Well into his ninth year as supreme leader, Kim Jong Un has shown a willingness to deviate from tradition and separate himself from the habits and behaviors of his predecessors. While site visits are a practice consistent with the past, Kim’s hands-on approach for major projects is an emerging signature of his leadership.

North Korea’s northeastern provinces, especially Ryanggang Province, play an important role in the country’s hydropower development plans. The Paektusan power station project was designed to provide uninterrupted electrical power to this area, where the recently opened showcase city of Samjiyon is situated, to fuel its success.

Antiquated facilities, equipment, and processes, together with the continual plague of electricity shortages, will hinder any dramatic production increases of magnesite at North Korea's Taehung Youth Hero Mine.

To help meet North Korea’s electrical energy needs, it has placed great emphasis on the use of hydropower. One strategy to improve this sector has been to shift focus from large-scale dams and hydropower plants to smaller ones, arranged in tiers.

North Korea has faced persistent challenges in generating sufficient electricity to meet its industrial and civil needs. While coal is a primary source of energy consumption, hydroelectric power is the predominant method of electricity production.

Ryongyang Mine is the largest magnesite mine in North Korea and one of the largest in the world. However, satellite and ground imagery show the infrastructure and technology in use at the mines is dated and obsolete when compared to world standards.

North Korea has faced persistent challenges in generating sufficient electricity to meet its industrial and civil needs. While coal is a primary source of energy consumption, hydroelectric power is the predominant method of electricity production.

Based on an initial look at North Korea's coal industry, the country's larger coal mines have remained active despite the increasing restrictions on the North's coal exports.

Despite increasing restrictions on the DPRK's coal exports, the country's larger coal mines have remained active from 2015 to 2019 and improvements have been made to its coal supply-chain infrastructure.

North and South Korea are moving forward with inter-Korean railway cooperation as a key engine for advancing inter-Korean reconciliation and building the infrastructure for eventual unification. These projects will all be costly and time intensive.

Update on North Korea's largest railroad rolling stock manufacturing and repair facility.

The fishing industry’s critical role in North Korea’s economy, particularly its foreign currency earning operations, led to a series of international sanctions on North Korean seafood.

Activity around Wonsan is likely to be a leading indication of inter-Korean joint declaration progress given its role both in the eastern transportation corridor and the national economy.

Connection and modernization of railways in the Korean peninsula's eastern transportation corridor is a declared step within the historic April 27, 2018 joint declaration for peace, prosperity, and unification.

In order to help establish his long-term legitimacy as leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-un has implemented numerous large-scale public works campaigns to raise living standards for targeted constituencies across the country.

Since 2017, Russia has become increasingly involved in the affairs of the Central African Republic (CAR). A recent agreement between the two countries granted the Russian mining company "Lobaye Invest" exclusive mineral rights to ore deposits throughout the country. Activity in these sites has resulted in observable environmental degradation in the mining permit areas.

China’s economic diplomacy has encouraged the use of special economic zones (SEZs) abroad. These areas of specialized regulation and incentives are aimed at attracting foreign investment. However, China’s emphasis on SEZs to promote quick economic growth has raised questions about whether China is sacrificing sustainable development for speed.

Evaluating the impact of SEZ development on land, water and air using satellite imagery, we identify examples of where zones appear to be succeeding or struggling to preserve and protect their local environmental conditions.

Social sustainability revolves around how the zone treats its workers and the surrounding community. We observed variation in the provision of housing, training facilities and quality of infrastructure supporting workers' commutes.

Despite significant strides in implementing domestic regulation to curb environmental degradation, the Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ) is an example of gaps that exist in China's sustainability practices overseas.

The Donbas has historically been the industrial heartland of Ukraine, serving as a center for industry and coal mining. The war in eastern Ukraine that began in 2014 led to the destruction of many forms of critical infrastructure and prohibited the maintenance of hundreds of coal mines. Destruction of this infrastructure has not only disrupted life in the region, but also set the stage for potential ecological damage.